This paper develops a contest model of a professional sports league in which clubs maximize a weighted sum of profits and wins (utility maximization). The model analyzes how more win-orientated behavior of certain clubs affects talent investments, competitive balance and club profits. Moreover, in contrast to traditional models, we show that revenue sharing does not always reduce investment incentives due to the dulling effect. We identify a new effect of revenue sharing called the "sharpening effect". In the presence of the sharpening effect (dulling effect), revenue sharing enhances (reduces) investment incentives and improves (deteriorates) competitive balance in the league.
Introduction
Existing models of team sports leagues assume that club owners maximize either pro…ts (El-Hodiri and Quirk, 1971; Fort and Quirk, 1995; Szymanski and Késenne, 2004; Falconieri et al., 2004) or wins (Késenne, 2000 (Késenne, , 2006 Zimbalist, 2003; Fort and Quirk, 2004; Vrooman, 2007) . This assumption is restrictive and not supported by evidence. In contrast, empirical evidence from North American major leagues and European leagues supports the assumption that clubs trade o¤ pro…ts and wins (e.g., Atkinson et al., 1988; Garcia-del-Barrio and Szymanski, 2009) .
Given this evidence, we present a contest model of a sports league in which club owners maximize a utility function given by a weighted sum of pro…ts and winning percentage. As compared to previous analyses, this model is useful to develop more general propositions. In particular, the model resolves much of the controversy surrounding the famous invariance proposition (IP) of sports economics. The IP may be regarded as a predecessor of the famous Coase theorem (see Fort, 2005) . According to the IP, which was introduced by Rottenberg (1956) , changes in property rights, such as the introduction of a reserve clause, will not alter the allocation of playing talent within a sports league and therefore will have no impact on competitive balance. El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) , Fort and Quirk (1995) and Vrooman (1995) have extended the IP to gate revenue sharing by showing that revenue sharing has no e¤ect on player allocation within a league. This result is of huge importance to professional team sports in general and league managers in particular because revenue sharing has been introduced as a means to increase competitive balance. The optimal level of competitive balance is crucial for overall demand and total revenues in professional sports as fans tend to prefer competitions with uncertain outcomes.
The IP with respect to revenue sharing was originally developed under the assumptions of purely pro…t-maximizing clubs and Walrasian conjectures.
1 Késenne (2000 Késenne ( , 2005 and Vrooman (2007 Vrooman ( , 2008 show that the IP does not hold in a league with purely win-maximizing clubs. Moreover, Szymanski and Késenne (2004) provide a model that contradicts the IP even under the assumption of purely pro…t-maximizing clubs. They show that under contest-Nash conjectures, revenue sharing does not increase but rather decreases competitive balance: see also , Vrooman (2008) , and . This result is driven by the so-called "dulling e¤ect" of revenue sharing. According to the dulling e¤ect, revenue sharing reduces the incentives for clubs to invest in playing talent because each club has to share some of the resulting marginal bene…ts of its talent investment with the other clubs in the league. 2 Dietl et al. (2009) con…rm the dulling e¤ect of revenue sharing in a league in which one club is a pure pro…t maximizer and the other club is a pure win maximizer. Our model has signi…cant implications for competition authorities and legislators because it derives new insights regarding the e¤ect of revenue sharing on investment incentives and competitive balance. In contrast to traditional models, our analysis shows that revenue sharing does not always reduce the incentives to invest in playing talent. We identify a new e¤ect of revenue sharing called the "sharpening e¤ect," which has the opposite e¤ect of the well-known dulling e¤ect. With our model, we can determine the conditions under which the sharpening e¤ect or the dulling e¤ect is at work. We show that in the presence of the sharpening e¤ect (dulling e¤ect), revenue sharing enhances (reduces) investment incentives and improves (deteriorates) competitive balance in the league. Moreover, we determine the conditions under which the IP holds even under contest-Nash conjectures. Finally, our model analyzes how a more win-orientated behavior of certain clubs a¤ects talent investments, competitive balance and club pro…ts.
Revenue-sharing schemes are widely applied in professional sports leagues all over the world. In the United States, one of the most prominent schemes is that operated by the National Football League (NFL) in which the visiting club secures 40% of the locally earned television and gate receipt revenue. In 1876, Major League Baseball (MLB) introduced a 50-50 split of gate receipts, which was reduced over time. Since 2003, all clubs in the American League have placed 34% of their locallygenerated revenue (i.e., gate revenues, concession revenues, television revenues and so on) into a central pool, which is then divided equally among all the clubs. The National Basketball Association (NBA) and the National Hockey League (NHL) also operate with a pool-sharing arrangement. In the Australian Football League (AFL), gate receipts were at one time split evenly between the home and the visiting team. This 50-50 split was …nally abolished in 2000.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our basic model without revenue sharing. In Section 3, we introduce a revenue-sharing arrangement and analyze its e¤ect on talent investment and competitive balance. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
The Basic Model

Notation and Assumptions
We model a two-club league in which both clubs participate in a non-cooperative game and independently invest a certain amount x i 2 R + in playing talent. The di¤erence of our model from traditional models of professional sports leagues is that, in our model, the club objective function is such that clubs maximize a utility function given by a weighted sum of pro…ts and wins.
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The win percentage w i of club i is characterized by the contest-success function (CSF), which maps the vector (x 1 ; x 2 ) of talent investment onto probabilities for each club. We apply the logit approach, which is probably the most widely-used functional form of a CSF in sporting contests. 4 The win percentage of club i = 1; 2 in this imperfectly discriminating contest is then given by
with i; j = 1; 2; i 6 = j. Given that win percentages must sum to unity, we obtain the adding-up constraint: w j = 1 w i . In our model, we adopt the contestNash conjectures dx i dx j = 0 and compute the derivative of (1) with respect to x i as
The uncertainty of outcome is measured by the competitive balance in the league. One way of measuring competitive balance is through the ratio of win percentages, which is also called win ratio (Hoehn and Szymanski, 1999; Vrooman, 2007 Vrooman, , 2008 . Without loss of generality, we de…ne the win ratio by the ratio of club 1's win percentage and club 2's win percentage:
Note that the win ratio W R equals one in a fully balanced league. A win ratio that is lower or higher than one thus indicates a league with a lower degree of competitive balance. Following the sports economic literature, we specify the revenue function of club 3 One exception is Rascher (1997) , who assumes that clubs maximize a linear combination of pro…ts and wins. However, the crucial di¤erence with respect to our model is that Rascher (1997) applies Walrasian conjectures and assumes a …xed supply of talent in the league. 4 The logit CSF was generally introduced by Tullock (1980) and was subsequently axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998) . Alternative functional forms include the probit CSF (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Dixit, 1987) and the di¤erence-form CSF (Hirshleifer, 1989) . See and Fort and Winfree (2009) for analyses of the CSF's discriminatory power in sporting contests.
where b > 0 characterizes the e¤ect of competitive balance on club revenues and m i 2 R + represents the market size parameter of club i.
It is important to mention that club i's revenues initially increase with winning until the maximum is reached for w
. By increasing the win percentage above w 0 i , club i's revenues start to decrease because excessive dominance by one team is detrimental to club revenues. This re ‡ects the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis; the higher b is, the more important is competitive balance and the sooner revenues start to decrease due to dominance by one team.
We further assume that clubs are heterogeneous with respect to their drawing potential or market size m i . Without loss of generality, we assume throughout this paper that club 1 is the large-market club with a high-drawing potential, while club 2 is the small-market club with a low-drawing potential such that m 1 > m 2 . As a consequence, the large-market club generates higher revenues than the small-market club for given win percentages (w 1 ; w 2 ).
By assuming a competitive labor market, the market clearing cost of a unit of talent, denoted by c, is the same for every club. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, we do not take into account non-labor costs and normalize the …xed capital cost to zero.
6 The cost function of club i = 1; 2 is thus given by C(x i ) = cx i , where c is the marginal unit cost of talent. The pro…t function of club i = 1; 2 is given by revenues minus costs and yields
with i; j = 1; 2; i 6 = j. As mentioned above, the utility function of club i is given by a weighted sum of one's own pro…ts and wins; it is de…ned as:
where i 2 R + 0 is the "win preference", which characterizes the weight club owner 5 This club-speci…c revenue function is widely used in the sports economics literature. For instance, our revenue is consistent with the revenue functions used in Hoehn and Szymanski (1999) , Szymanski (2003) , Szymanski and Késenne (2004) , Késenne (2006 Késenne ( , 2007 and Vrooman (2007 Vrooman ( , 2008 . 6 See Vrooman (1995) for a more general cost function or Késenne (2007) for a cost function with a …xed capital cost. Moreover, Grossmann et al. (2008) analyze the e¤ect of revenue sharing on competitive balance in the case of a convex cost function with constant marginal cost elasticity.
i puts on winning in the utility function. A higher parameter i thus re ‡ects that club owner i becomes more win-orientated and less pro…t-orientated.
Moreover, note that we have two dimensions of heterogeneity in our model. On the one hand, clubs di¤er with respect to their market size and on the other hand, clubs di¤er regarding their win preference. In the following sections, we analyze the interaction e¤ects of these two dimensions of heterogeneity.
Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we solve the model and determine the equilibrium. Each club i maximizes utility and thus solves the following maximization problem:
The …rst-order conditions for club i = 1; 2 are thus given by:
with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j. The solution to the above maximization problem is presented in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 test
In a league with utility-maximizing clubs, the equilibrium investment and win percentage of club i are given by
with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j.
Proof. Straightforward and therefore omitted. In order to guarantee positive equilibrium investments, we assume that either the clubs'market sizes or the win preferences are su¢ ciently large such that m 1 + 1 + m 2 + 2 > b.
Lemma 1 shows that ceteris paribus, the win percentage of club i increases with either a higher win preference i or a larger market size m i : i.e., A comparison of the equilibrium investments of the two clubs leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 test
In a league with utility-maximizing clubs, the small-market club invests more than the large-market club if and only if m 2 + 2 > m 1 + 1 .
Proof. Straightforward and therefore omitted.
In contrast to traditional models of sports leagues with pure pro…t-and/or winmaximizing clubs, in our model, it is possible that the small-market club invests more in equilibrium and, as a consequence, is the dominant team that has a higher win percentage than the large-market club.
7 This outcome occurs if the utility of the small-market club has a su¢ ciently high win preference parameter. In this case, the win preference compensates for the lower market size such that marginal revenue is higher for the small-market club than for the large-market club, ceteris paribus. However, if the sum of market size and win preference of the large-market club is larger than (equal to) the sum of market size and win preference of the small-market club, then the former invests more than (the same as) the latter.
The E¤ect on Competitive Balance
The e¤ect of market sizes and win preferences on competitive balance in the league is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 test
In a league with utility-maximizing clubs, the win ratio in equilibrium is given by
Therefore, if clubs become more win-orientated, competitive balance may increase or decrease depending on the market size parameters (m 1 ; m 2 ) and the win preference parameters ( 1 ; 2 ) of the two clubs.
Proof. Straightforward and therefore omitted. As a benchmark case, consider a league with pure pro…t-maximizing clubs, i.e., the two clubs increases (decreases), the win ratio W R increases (decreases): thus, the league becomes less (more) balanced. This result is well known in the sports economics literature (Fort and Quirk, 1995; Vrooman, 1995; Szymanski, 2003) . However, if the club owner of at least one club becomes more win-orientated (i.e., 1 > 0 and/or 2 > 0), then the league may become more or less balanced than in the benchmark case with pure pro…t-maximizing clubs. To illustrate this result, consider the following three cases.
(i) The large-market club has a positive win preference and the small-market club is a pure pro…t-maximizer: i.e., 1 > 0 and 2 = 0. In this case, the league is less balanced than in the benchmark case, and competitive balance decreases if the large-market club becomes more win-orientated (i.e., 1 increases).
(ii) The large-market club is a pure pro…t-maximizer and the small-market club has a positive win preference: i.e., 1 = 0 and 2 > 0. In this case, the league is more balanced than in the benchmark case if and only if the win preference of the small-market club is su¢ ciently small, i.e., 2 < 0 2 m 2 1 =m 2 m 2 . Moreover, competitive balance increases if the small-market club becomes more win-orientated, i.e., 2 increases. If, however, 2 > 0 2 , then the league is characterized by a lower degree of competitive balance. Note that the small-market club is the dominant team, and competitive balance decreases with a higher win preference 2 of the small-market club.
(iii) Both clubs have a positive win preference: i.e., 1 > 0 and 2 > 0. As in case (ii), the league is more balanced than in the benchmark case if and only if the win preference of the small-market club is su¢ ciently small, i.e., 2 < 00 2
[m 1 (m 1 + 1 )] =m 2 m 2 . However, if 2 > 00 2 , then the league is less balanced than in the benchmark case with the small-market club being the dominant team.
The E¤ect on Club Pro…ts
In this section, we determine how the win preferences a¤ect aggregate club pro…ts in a league with utility-maximizing clubs. For this purpose, we normalize the marketsize parameters as follows: m 1 m and m 2 1, with m > 1. Moreover, we set b = 1. We concentrate on two cases. In case (i), the large-market club is a pure pro…t-maximizer, and the small-market club has a positive win preference: i.e., 1 = 0 and 2 > 0. In case (ii), the large-market club has a positive win preference, and the small-market club is a pure pro…t-maximizer: i.e., 1 > 0 and 2 = 0. 8 8 Regarding the e¤ect on utility, one can show that the utility of club i increases with its win preference parameter i and decreases with the win preference parameter j of the other club. The e¤ect on aggregate utility in the league, however, is ambiguous and depends on the parameters ( i ; m i ). In particular, in the case of 1 > 0 and 2 = 0, aggregate utility in the league always For case (i), we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 3 test Suppose that 1 = 0 and 2 > 0. Aggregate club pro…ts decrease when the smallmarket club becomes more win-orientated (i.e., 2 increases).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Consider a league in which the large-market club is a pure pro…t-maximizer, while the small-market club has a positive win preference: i.e., 1 = 0 and 2 > 0. If the small-market club becomes more win-orientated, then the win percentages of the small-market club increases, whereas the win percentage of the large-market club decreases (see discussion after Lemma 1). It follows that the revenues of the small-market club increase, while the revenues of the large-market club decrease through a higher win preference of the small-market club: i.e., @R 2 =@ 2 > 0 and
9 Moreover, the small-market club increases its investment in playing talent, which induces higher costs for this club. The increase in revenues, however, cannot compensate for the increase in costs such that pro…ts of the small-market club decrease. The large-market club, on the other hand, decreases or increases its talent investment, i.e., @x 1 =@ 2 R 0 , m(m 1) R 2 2
1. But even if the large-market club's costs decrease due to smaller investments, club pro…ts decrease as well because the lower costs cannot compensate for the lower revenues. Since pro…ts of both types of clubs decrease, aggregate club pro…ts also decrease.
For case (ii), we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 4 test Suppose that 1 > 0 and 2 = 0. Aggregate club pro…ts increase when the largemarket club becomes more win-orientated (i.e., 1 increases) if and only if the market size of the large-market club is su¢ ciently large.
Proof. See Appendix A.2. Consider a league in which the large-market club has a positive win preference, while the small-market club is a pure pro…t-maximizer: i.e., 1 > 0 and 2 = 0. In contrast to the proposition above, a higher win preference 1 yields higher revenues for the large-market club due to a higher win percentage in equilibrium. The opposite holds true for the small-market club. Moreover, talent investment and thus costs are always higher for the large-market club, whereas talent investment increases if the large-market club becomes more win-orientated, whereas in the case of 1 = 0 and 2 > 0, the e¤ect on aggregate utility is ambiguous if the small-market club becomes more win-orientated. 9 Note that the revenue function of club i = 1; 2 is a strictly increasing function on the interval
are lower for the small-market club if and only if the market size of the large-market club is su¢ ciently large with m > m 0 2
1 . Even though costs may decrease for the small-market club, the loss in revenues is so substantial that the pro…ts of the small-market club always decrease.
In contrast, the pro…ts of the large-market club increase if the market size of the large-market club is su¢ ciently large such that (m+ 1 ) [m(m + 1 2) 4 1 ] > 1 is satis…ed. In this case, higher revenues compensate for higher costs. If the market size of the large-market club further increases above another threshold given by
> m 0 , the higher pro…ts of the largemarket club compensate for the lower pro…ts of the small-market club, and aggregate club pro…ts increase.
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3 The E¤ect of Revenue Sharing in a League with
Utility-Maximizing Clubs
In this section, we integrate a gate revenue-sharing arrangement into our model and analyze its e¤ects in a league with utility-maximizing clubs. The sharing of gate revenues plays an important role in the redistribution of revenues and has long been accepted as an exemption from antitrust law (Fort and Quirk, 1995; Szymanski, 2003) . The basic idea of this cross-subsidization policy is to redistribute revenues from large-market clubs to small-market clubs because large-market clubs have a higher revenue-generating potential than do small-market clubs.
In its simplest form, gate revenue sharing allows the visiting club to retain a share of the home club's gate revenues. The after-sharing revenues of club i are given by b R i = R i + (1 )R j , with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j. Note that the share of revenues that is assigned to the home team is given by the parameter 2 [1=2; 1], while (1 ) is assumed to be the share of revenues received by the away team. Thus, the utility of club i in a league with utility-maximizing clubs is given by b
Maximizing utility b u i yields the following maximization problem of club i = 1; 2:
(9) with i; j = 1; 2; i 6 = j.
The corresponding …rst-order conditions are computed as
with
. Rearranging the …rst-order conditions yields
We determine the equilibrium win percentages in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 test In a league with utility-maximizing clubs and a revenue-sharing arrangement, the equilibrium win percentage of club i is given by
with i; j = 1; 2; i 6 = j.
Proof. See Appendix A.3. From Lemma 2, we compute the equilibrium win ratio in a league with utilitymaximizing clubs as:
As in a league without revenue sharing, the small-market club invests more in equilibrium and consequently has a higher win percentage than the large-market club if and only if the sum of the market size and win preference for the small-market club is larger than that for the large-market club: i.e., m 2 + 2 > m 1 + 1 . 11 In this case, we obtain d W R < 1. If, however, m 2 + 2 m 1 + 1 , then the large-market club does not invest less than the small-market club, i.e., d W R 1. Regarding the e¤ect of revenue sharing on club revenues, we compute the partial derivative of club i's marginal revenue M R i = @ b R i =@w i with respect to the revenuesharing parameter as:
11 Note that this condition does not depend on the revenue-sharing parameter .
with i; j = 1; 2; i 6 = j. We derive that a higher degree of revenue sharing (i.e., a lower parameter ) has a positive e¤ect on club i's marginal revenue if b > m 1 +m 2 , while it has a negative e¤ect on marginal revenue if b < m 1 + m 2 . In the case that b = m 1 + m 2 , revenue sharing has no e¤ect on marginal revenue. To further analyze the e¤ect of revenue sharing on competitive balance, we derive the partial derivative of the win ratio d W R as:
In equilibrium, the e¤ect of revenue sharing on the win ratio and the incentives to invest depends on how revenue sharing a¤ects marginal revenue (i.e., b T m 1 + m 2 ) as well as on which club is the dominant team in equilibrium (i.e., m 1 + 1 T m 2 + 2 ).
We proceed by di¤erentiating three cases. 12 In Section 3.1, revenue sharing has a positive e¤ect on marginal revenue: i.e., b > m 1 + m 2 . In Section 3.2, revenue sharing has a negative e¤ect on marginal revenue: i.e., b < m 1 + m 2 . Finally, in Section 3.3, revenue sharing has no e¤ect on marginal revenue: i.e., b = m 1 + m 2 .
The Sharpening E¤ect of Revenue Sharing
The integration of a win preference parameter i for club i allows that the case in which revenue sharing has a positive e¤ect on marginal revenue is a feasible equilibrium outcome. Without a win preference parameter, the parameter constellation b > m 1 + m 2 would not constitute an equilibrium. This parameterization implies that in equilibrium, the win percentage b w 1 of the large-market club and/or the win percentage b w 2 of the small-market club are higher than the revenue-maximizing win percentages w 0 1 = m 1 =b and/or w 0 2 = m 2 =b. In this case, the marginal revenue of club 1 and/or club 2 would be negative, which is not feasible in equilibrium. The negative marginal revenue, however, can be compensated by additional marginal revenue through the integration of a win preference parameter i . Due to this additional e¤ect with respect to the marginal revenue of investment, the parameter constellation b > m 1 + m 2 is feasible in equilibrium.
In the case that revenue sharing has a positive e¤ect on marginal revenue, we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 5 test
Suppose that b > m 1 +m 2 . In a league with utility-maximizing clubs, a higher degree of revenue sharing will: (a) increase the amount of talent hired by each club, and (b) increase competitive balance if either the small-market club or the largemarket club is the dominant team in equilibrium. In the case that both clubs have equal playing strength in equilibrium, the IP holds.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
With respect to part (a) and in contrast to the established literature, 13 this proposition shows that revenue sharing does not necessarily reduce incentives to invest in playing talent. If revenue sharing has a positive e¤ect on marginal revenue for both clubs, then a higher degree of revenue sharing enhances incentives to invest in playing talent, and both clubs will increase the amount of talent hired in equilibrium. Thus, we identify a new e¤ect of revenue sharing that we call the "sharpening e¤ect." Note that this sharpening e¤ect of revenue sharing has the opposite e¤ect of the dulling e¤ect described in Section 3.2.
14 Furthermore, part (b) shows that in the presence of the sharpening e¤ect, a revenue-sharing arrangement proves to be an e¢ cient instrument for improving competitive balance in an unbalanced league. We explain the intuition behind this result as follows.
If the large-market club is the dominant team in equilibrium (i.e., d W R > 1),
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then the positive e¤ect of revenue sharing on marginal revenue is stronger for the underdog (i.e., small-market club) than for the dominant team (i.e., large-market club) due to the logit formulation of the CSF. As a consequence, the sharpening e¤ect of revenue sharing is more pronounced for the underdog than for the dominant team, since the (negative) marginal impact on the dominant team's revenues of an increase in talent investment by the underdog is greater than the (negative) marginal impact on the underdog's revenues of an increase in talent investment by the dominant team. As a consequence, the small-market club will increase its investment level relatively more than the large-market club such that the league becomes more balanced through revenue sharing. If, however, the small-market club is the dominant team in equilibrium (i.e., d W R < 1 , m 1 + 1 < m 2 + 2 ), then the positive e¤ect of revenue sharing on marginal revenue is stronger for the large-market club than for the small-market club. In this case, the sharpening e¤ect of revenue sharing is stronger for the largemarket club. Again, the underdog (in this case, the large-market club) will increase its investment level relatively more than the dominant team (in this case, the small-market club) such that the league becomes more balanced through revenue sharing. In the case that the league is already perfectly balanced (i.e., both clubs have equal playing strength in equilibrium such that d W R = 1), the (marginal) sharpening e¤ect of revenue sharing is equally strong for both clubs. As a consequence, both clubs will marginally increase their investment level at an equal rate and competitive balance will not be altered through revenue sharing such that the IP holds.
The Dulling E¤ect of Revenue Sharing
In the case that revenue sharing has a negative e¤ect on marginal revenue, we establish the following proposition:
Proposition 6 test Suppose that b < m 1 +m 2 . In a league with utility-maximizing clubs, a higher degree of revenue sharing will:
(a) reduce the amount of talent hired by each club, and (b) decrease competitive balance if either the small-market club or the largemarket club is the dominant team in equilibrium. In the case that both clubs have equal playing strength in equilibrium, the IP holds.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Part (a) shows that each club reduces the amount of talent hired in equilibrium if revenue sharing has a negative e¤ect on marginal revenue of both clubs in equilibrium. That is, in this case, the well-known dulling e¤ect of revenue sharing is present.
Part (b) shows that a revenue-sharing arrangement will worsen the competitive balance in an already unbalanced league if revenue sharing has a negative e¤ect on marginal revenue. With a similar argumentation as above, this dulling e¤ect is more pronounced for the underdog than for the dominant team, since the (positive) marginal impact on the dominant team's revenues of a decrease in talent investment by the underdog is greater than the (positive) marginal impact on the underdog's revenues of a decrease in talent investment by the dominant team. If the largemarket club is the dominant team in equilibrium, then the small-market club will reduce its investment level relatively more than the large-market club such that the league becomes less balanced through revenue sharing. This replicates the result of Szymanski and Késenne (2004) .
If, however, the small-market club is the dominant team in equilibrium, then the dulling e¤ect of revenue sharing is stronger for the large-market club than for the small-market club. In this case, the large-market club will reduce its investment level relatively more than the small-market club. As a result, the league becomes again less balanced through revenue sharing.
In the case that the league is already perfectly balanced, the (marginal) dulling e¤ect is equally strong for both clubs such that both clubs will marginally decrease their investment level at an equal rate. As a consequence, competitive balance will not be altered through revenue sharing, and the IP holds again.
No E¤ect of Revenue Sharing
In the case that revenue sharing has no e¤ect on marginal revenue, we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 7 test
Suppose that b = m 1 +m 2 . In a league with utility-maximizing clubs, a higher degree of revenue sharing has no e¤ect on equilibrium investment such that the IP holds.
Proof. See proof of Proposition 5.
The proposition shows that revenue sharing has no e¤ect on talent investment, and thus, it does not change the level of competitive balance in the league if revenue sharing has no e¤ect on marginal revenue. As a consequence, the IP with respect to revenue sharing holds even under contest-Nash conjectures. Note that up until now, the IP has been derived only under Walrasian conjectures.
Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a contest model of a sports league and introduce a more general objective function for club owners by assuming that clubs maximize a weighted sum of pro…ts and wins. This approach fundamentally di¤ers from traditional analyses of sports leagues, which assume either pure pro…t-maximizing and/or win-maximizing clubs. Evidence from the real world of major sports leagues, however, suggests that clubs trade o¤ pro…ts and wins.
Our model has signi…cant implications for competition authorities and legislators because it provides new insights regarding the e¤ect of revenue sharing on investment incentives as well as determines the conditions under which revenue sharing increases or decreases competitive balance. The model also analyzes how more win-orientated behavior of certain clubs a¤ects talent investment, competitive balance and club pro…ts. In particular, we show that the small-market club will be the dominant team in equilibrium and will invest more than the large-market club if the small-market club has a su¢ ciently high preference for winning. In this case, the resulting incentive e¤ect to invest in playing talent compensates for the size effect. The e¤ect of more win-orientated behavior of certain clubs on the competitive balance in the league is ambiguous and depends on the market-size parameters and the win preferences. We further show that aggregate club pro…ts decrease with a more win-orientated behavior on the part of the small-market club in a league in which the large-market club is a pure pro…t-maximizer. On the other hand, in a league in which the small-market club is a pure pro…t-maximizer, aggregate club pro…ts may increase through a more win-orientated behavior on the part of the large-market club.
Regarding the e¤ect of revenue sharing, our analysis shows that contrary to traditional models, revenue sharing may enhance incentives to invest in playing talent. Thus, we identify a new e¤ect of revenue sharing called the "sharpening e¤ect", which has the opposite e¤ect of the well-known dulling e¤ect. As a consequence, revenue sharing may increase or decrease competitive balance, or it may have no e¤ect on competitive balance such that the invariance proposition (IP) holds. The e¤ect of revenue sharing on competitive balance depends on (i) which club has a higher win percentage and thus is the dominant team in equilibrium, and (ii) whether the sharpening or dulling e¤ect of revenue sharing is at work. The following table summarizes the results. Remember that the sharpening e¤ect is present if revenue sharing has a positive e¤ect on marginal revenue (i.e., b > m 1 + m 2 ), whereas the dulling e¤ect is present if revenue sharing has a negative e¤ect on marginal revenue (i.e., b < m 1 + m 2 ). If b = m 1 + m 2 , then revenue sharing has no e¤ect on marginal revenue. Also recall that in equilibrium the sharpening or dulling e¤ect is always more pronounced for the underdog than for the dominant team. 16 As a consequence, the e¤ect of revenue sharing on competitive balance crucially depends on whether the sharpening e¤ect or the dulling e¤ect is at work. Table 1 shows that, in the presence of the sharpening e¤ect (dulling e¤ect), revenue sharing will improve (deteriorate) competitive balance if the league is not yet fully balanced. This holds true independent of which club is the dominant team in equilibrium. In the case in which the league is already fully balanced in equilibrium (i.e., both clubs have the same win percentage), then revenue sharing has no e¤ect on competitive balance, and the IP holds. The IP also holds if revenue sharing has no e¤ect on marginal revenue, independent of whether the league is already fully balanced.
An interesting avenue for further research in this area is the analysis of salary restrictions (caps and ‡oors). A salary cap ( ‡oor) puts an upper (lower) bound on a club's payroll and have been introduced as a measure to improve competitive balance in sports leagues. Salary restrictions are widely applied in professional sports leagues all over the world. In the NHL, for example, each team had to spend between US$ 34.3 million and 50.3 million on player salaries in the 2007-08 season. In the NFL, the salary cap in 2009 is approximately US$ 128 million per team, whereas the salary ‡oor was 87.6% of the salary cap, which is equivalent to US$ 112.1 million. The AFL also operates with a combined salary cap and ‡oor: for 2009, the salary cap was …xed at A$ 7.69 million, the ‡oor at 7.12 million.
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Our model framework can be used to analyze the e¤ect of such salary restrictions on competitive balance, talent investment, and club pro…ts in sports leagues with utility-maximizing clubs.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that m 1 = m and m 2 = 1 with m > 1 and b = 1. Moreover, consider a league in which the large-market club is a pure pro…t-maximizer and the smallmarket club has a positive win preference, i.e., 1 = 0 and 2 > 0. In this scenario, equilibrium talent investments are given by
The partial derivatives of talent investments with respect to the win preference parameter 2 yield
for all c > 0, m > 1 and 2 > 0. The pro…t of club i = 1; 2 is given by
The partial derivatives of club pro…ts with respect to the win preference parameter 2 yield:
for all c > 0, m > 1 and 2 > 0. This means that pro…ts of the small-market club and the large-market club always decrease with a higher win preference 2 . It follows that aggregate club pro…ts also decrease. This completes the proof of the proposition.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that m 1 = m and m 2 = 1 with m > 1 and b = 1. Moreover, consider a league in which the large-market club has a positive win preference and the smallmarket club is a pure pro…t-maximizer, i.e., 1 > 0 and 2 = 0. In this scenario, equilibrium talent investments are given by
The partial derivatives of talent investments with respect to the win preference parameter 1 yield
The pro…t of club i = 1; 2 is given by
The partial derivative of club 1's pro…ts with respect to the win preference parameter 1 yields:
The inequality is satis…ed for m su¢ ciently large. The partial derivative of club 2's pro…ts with respect to the win preference parameter 1 yields:
for all c > 0, m > 1 and 2 > 0.
The partial derivative of aggregate club pro…ts with respect to the win preference parameter 1 is given by
The last inequality is satis…ed for m > m
This completes the proof of the proposition.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Rewriting the …rst-order conditions, we obtain:
Combining both equations and rearranging yields
In equilibrium (x 1 ; x 2 ), it must hold:
This implies that
with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j. This completes the proof of the lemma.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Part (a) We claim that the e¤ect of more revenue sharing on talent investments depends on how revenue sharing a¤ects marginal revenue in equilibrium. In this proof, we will show that a higher degree of revenue sharing (i) decreases equilibrium investment of each club if b < m 1 + m 2 , (ii) increases equilibrium investment of each club if b > m 1 + m 2 , and (iii) has no e¤ect on equilibrium investment of each club if b = (m 1 + m 2 ).
To prove this claim, we derive the total di¤erential of the …rst-order conditions
For notational convenience, we write:
The total di¤erential of the …rst-order conditions from above can also be written as
where
Note that in equilibrium it must hold that
Applying Cramer's Rule to (15), we derive
In order to ensure a maximum, we need the stability condition b u 11 b u 22 b u 12 b u 21 > 0. Therefore, the denominator has to be positive (see, e.g., Dixit, 1986 and Késenne, 2004) .
The sign of the numerator depends on how revenue sharing a¤ects marginal revenue. We di¤erentiate three cases: < 0, i.e.,revenue sharing induces the dominant team (club 2) to increase its investment. Since revenue sharing increases competitive balance, the underdog (club 1) has to increase its investment as well, i.e. It follows that a higher degree of revenue sharing (i.e., a lower parameter ) implies higher marginal revenue for both clubs. We di¤erentiate three cases: (i) Assume that m 1 + 1 = m 2 + 2 . In this case, it is easy to see that revenue sharing has no e¤ect on competitive balance and the IP holds, since
(ii) Assume that m 1 + 1 > m 2 + 2 . In this case, the large-market club 1 invests more in talent and thus has a higher win percentage than the small-market club 2 in equilibrium. Furthermore, e¤ect of revenue sharing on marginal revenue is stronger for the small-market club. Therefore, d W R > 1 decreases and competitive balance increases if revenue sharing increases.
(iii) Assume that m 1 + 1 < m 2 + 2 . In this case, the small-market club 2 invests more in talent and thus has a higher win percentage than the large-market club 1 in equilibrium. Furthermore, @M R 2 @ < @M R 1 @ since x 2 > x 1 , such that the positive e¤ect of revenue sharing on marginal revenue is stronger for the large-market club. Therefore, d
W R < 1 increases and competitive balance increases if revenue sharing increases.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Part (a) Note that we have proven the claim already in Proposition 5. Part (b) Suppose that b < m 1 + m 2 . We claim that a higher degree of revenue sharing decreases competitive balance if either the small-market club or the largemarket club is the dominant team in equilibrium. In the case that both clubs have equal playing strength in equilibrium, the IP holds.
As in the proof of Proposition 5, the sign of > 0 if b < m 1 + m 2 . It follows that a higher degree of revenue sharing (i.e., a lower parameter ) implies higher marginal revenue for both clubs.
Again, we di¤erentiate three cases: (i) Assume that m 1 + 1 = m 2 + 2 . In this case, it is easy to see that revenue sharing has no e¤ect on competitive balance and the IP holds, since
(ii) Assume that m 1 + 1 > m 2 + 2 . In this case, the large-market club 1 invests more in talent and thus has a higher win percentage than the small-market club 2 in equilibrium. Furthermore, @M R 1 @ < @M R 2 @ since x 1 > x 2 , such that the negative e¤ect of revenue sharing on marginal revenue is stronger for the smallmarket club. Therefore, d
W R > 1 increases even more and competitive balance decreases if revenue sharing increases.
(iii) Assume that m 1 + 1 < m 2 + 2 . In this case, the small-market club 2 invests more in talent and thus has a higher win percentage than the large-market club 1 in equilibrium. Furthermore, @M R 2 @ < @M R 1 @ since x 2 > x 1 , such that the negative e¤ect of revenue sharing on marginal revenue is stronger for the largemarket club. Therefore, d
W R < 1 decreases even more and competitive balance decreases if revenue sharing increases.
